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DIVORCE: LIVING APART STATUTES
AS A REPLACEMENT FOR FAULT
Statistics indicate that in one out of every 4.1 marriages' the mar-
riage vows might be rephrased to read "until divorce do us part."2
The divorce-marriage ratio fifty-eight years ago is estimated at one to
13.28.3 This startling increase between 1900 and 1956 has evoked a
variety of suggestions and proposals ranging from free love to a re-
turn to the strictness of the middle ages.4 Most of the suggestions,
when offered as a panacea, may be analogized as an attempt to treat
an internal wound by an external application. They diagnose divorce
as the infection, when in fact it is the attempted surgical medication5
An awareness that divorce is not the cause of a marriage failure but
is the legal termination of a marriage that has already factually failed
will prompt inquiry into the true causes. According to prevailing di-
vorce statutes, cause-synonymous with grounds-for divorce gener-
ally includes adultery, cruelty and desertion.6 These grounds, seldom
the actual cause of the breach, are often recognized torts intervening
between the more fundamental breach and the suit for divorce.7 Gen-
1. Vital Statistics, Special Reports, National Summaries, Vol. 48, April 9, 1958.
2. "[Statistics] tend to make a mockery of the sacramental phrases which are
traditionally used to tie the bonds of matrimony. If the phrases reflected the
divorce statistics, they would read 'till death or the divorce court do you part."'
Ploscowe, The Truth About Divorce 2 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Ploscowe).
3. Vital Statistics, Special Reports, National Summaries, Vol. 31, Nov. 4, 1949.
4. Free love is based on the premise that a permanent marriage relationship is
becoming outmoded. A variation of this is the "trial marriage" primarily for
sexual experience, differing from free love in that it contemplates permanency.
Parsons, The Family, An Ethnological and Historical Outline 348-49 (1906). A
suggestion of a companionate marriage contemplates a tentative "legal" marriage
for purposes of determining the desirability of a permanent relationship. This
marriage could be dissolved by consent prior to the birth of children. Knight,
The Companionate and the Family, 10 Journ. of Social Hygiene 257 (May 1924).
The most conservative approach calls for a return to the allegedly indissoluble
marriage. Kelly, Catholic Law, 2 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp. 14 (1949-50).
Idealists, approaching the problem from a sociological standpoint, list a set of
rules for the good husband and the good wife. Mowrer, Family Disorganization 10
(1927). Others suggest education and reconciliation fostered by marriage clinics
conjunctive with domestice relations courts. Chute, Divorce and the Family Court,
18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 49 (1953).
5. See Ernst and Loth, For Better or Worse 245 (1952).
6. Harper, Problems of the Family 657 (1952).
7. If a determination of fault is made, it is an "indemnification for tort" and
should be irrelevant to family law. Silving, Divorce Without Fault, 29 Iowa L.
Rev. 527, 533 (1944).
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erally marital instability results from inter-personal conflicts, beyond
the investigation of the trial court, and often beyond reparation by
the parties. Divorce is fundamentally a sociological problem, caused
by divergent personalities, created in different environments and
complicated by a time of changing values and personal needs. The
requirement of fault for divorce is an attempt to solve this sociological
problem by a resort to standard legal criteria. The many fictions,
collusive suits and archaic concepts that have appeared in modern
divorce practice may be attributed to the use of the fault doctrine.
Any initial attempt to modernize the present structure of domestic
relations law necessitates a re-examination of the whole fault doctrine
with an eye toward its complete replacement by the adoption of living
apart statutes.
A pure living apart statute would provide for a judicial decree of
divorce after a husband and wife had lived apart continuously for a
specified period of time with the intention of discontinuing the marital
relationship. To assess the worth of living apart statutes as a present
day solution to the confusion, fictions and inconsistencies existing in
American divorce laws, it is necessary to trace briefly the historical
superstructure on which modern divorce laws are erected.,
HISTORY
Pre-Christian ideas of marriage and divorce are as varied as the
number of societies that existed at that time. The permanence of
marital ties ranged from terminable at will to indissoluble.1° There is
evidence that marriage, and correspondingly divorce, existed even in
pre-literate societies, and was controlled by custom and ministered by
8. See text supported by notes 28-39 infra.
9. For a history of marriage and divorce see generally Goodsell, A History of
Marriage and the Family (1934) (hereinafter cited as Goodsell); Howard, A
History of Matrimonial Institutions (1904). For English legislative history see
Bishop, Commentaries of the Law of Marriage and Divorce (5th ed. 1873); and
for recent English history see A Century of Family Law (Graveson & Crane ed.
1957).
10. In primitive societies marriage was commonly considered a private contract
and was dissolvable at the will of one or both parties. Goodsell 30. In Hebrew
society, divorce, while originally obtained merely by Writing the wife a "bill of
divorcement" and sending her out of the house, was later limited to certain defined
moral offenses. The wife had no divorce privileges. Goodsell 70-72. In early Greek
society a husband was considered justified in obtaining a divorce if the wife was
either barren or had committed adultery. Goodsell 98-101. In the Roman Empire
about the second century B.C., marriages could be dissolved at pleasure. Goodsell
144. Under the laws of Manu, a Hindu civilization, marriage was considered in-
dissoluble. Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism 500 (4th ed. 1891).
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the individual." As custom grew into law, states gradually began to
exert controls over individual freedom to marry and divorce. In spite
of this, a divorce could generally be procured at the whim of the
husband or by mutual consent of the parties. The doctrine of fault,
while existing in some societies, played little part in the termination
of the marital relationship. 12 Attempts to control divorce were not
entirely successful and many abuses existed.13 It was not until the
rise of the Christian religion that western civilization developed the
current idea of a monogamous, continuous, and permanent marriage.'
14
During the first few centuries after the beginnings of Christianity,
marriage maintained its secular significance. Church control came
gradually, however, and complete domination was achieved in approx-
imately the twelfth century." Some of the delay can be attributed to
an enigma which developed in church doctrine. Continued expansion
of church control over marriage was inconsistent with ideals of celi-
11. 1 Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage 26-76 (1901). The ease
and reasons for obtaining divorce were dependent upon the form of marriage, e.g.,
where polyandry was condoned, or where the line of inheritance traced through
the mother, the right of divorce rested chiefly in the wife; but in the case of
polygamy and patrilineal descent divorce rested chiefly in the husband. Sumner,
Folkways 377-78 (1906).
12. See note 10 supra. However, when an act, considered morally reprehensible,
was committed against the marriage other dire consequences might have resulted.
Under Julian law during the Roman Empire the father of an unfaithful wife
was permitted to kill both the daughter and her lover. Goodsell 147. Under the
Code of Hammurabi, in 2300 B.C. adultery by the wife was not a ground for
divorce, but carried the penalty of the wife and lover being bound and thrown in
the water. Harper, Code of Hammurabi § 129 (1904). Adultery was not a ground
for divorce in early Anglo-Saxon law, though it was punishable pecuniarily.
Lichtenberger, Divorce, A Social Interpretation 62-65 (1931) (hereinafter cited
as Lichtenberger).
13. See, e.g., Goodsell 145, where the author notes that attempts by Roman
emperors to curb divorce abuses had little effect.
14. The teaching of Matthew 19:6 that "What therefore God hath joined
together, let no man put asunder," is generally considered the basis of the sacra-
mental concept of marriage. The further admonition in Matthew 19:7-9 that
whoever puts away his wife except for fornication, commits adultery, is the
assumed basis for considering divorce as an evil.
15. The rise of the ecclesiastical marriage began with the church's benediction
of the nuptials. Religious control increased in the fifth century with the advent
of the bride-mass, but its function being purely religious the church gained no
legal control. In the tenth century, though the marriage was complete, the priest
participated in the ceremony and gave a second blessing within the church. The
fourth step was the celebration of the ceremony by the priest, although the cere-
mony took place outside the church door. Finally canon law replaced secular
jurisdiction. 1 Howard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 62-65. Chronologically this event
can be traced to the Council of Trent in 1563. Lichtenberger 87.
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bacy which had become part of basic church dogma. 6 Marriage was
regarded as an evil because of the impurity of the sex act.17 To en-
courage the solemnization of marriage in the church therefore ap-
peared to be contradictory. The sacramental theory of marriage solved
the dilemma of the church and profoundly influenced all future ideas
of marriage and, consequently, divorce.18 Marriage, as a sacrament,
was considered indissoluble except by death. To effectuate this con-
cept the church finally achieved complete control of divorce in its own
ecclesiastical courts.1 9 Absolute divorce, being contrary to church
doctrine, was practically non-existent.2o There were, however, pro-
visions for declaring a marriage void ab initio, and separation was
allowed when certain fault grounds were shown.21 It is this heritage
which the early American colonists brought to this country.
The New England colonies, influenced by the Reformation, rejected
the sacramental and adopted the civil contract theory of marriage,22
a concept which has spread to all jurisdictions in the United States.
Consistent with the civil contract theory, divorce, when allowed at all,
was granted by civil government rather than ecclesiastical authority.23
Absolute divorce, as well as judicial separation, was generally obtain-
able in the northern colonies. 24 Thus, from colonial time, civil control
replaced church control over marriage and divorce. Yet church in-
fluence remained. The fault doctrine used by ecclesiastical courts in
granting separations formed the basis for American divorce law.21
The only change from this basic structure has been an expansion of
16. Messer, The Family in the Making 144-45 (1928) (hereinafter cited as
Messer).
17. Messer 150.
18. Lichtenberger 82-87.
19. See Goodsell 211-15.
20. Messer 167-68.
21. The practice of annulment of marriages was fairly widespread and grounds
for annulment, such as affinity, were often invented by the parties. Divorce a
mensa et thoro (from bed and board) was allowed on grounds of adultery, heresy,
and cruelty. Goodsell 213. Absolute divorce could be procured in rare cases by
act of parliament from about the seventeenth century. A Century of Family Law
5 (Graveson & Crane ed. 1957).
22. The southern colonies, however, adopted the English idea of marriage as a
sacrament, so that considerable variation existed in the colonies as a whole.
Goodsell 366-67.
23. Goodsell 392-97. McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested Approach, 9 Vand. L.
Rev. 685, 689 (1956).
24. Goodsell 392-97. In the southern colonies there were no ecclesiastical courts,
yet neither were there provisions for divorce by civil authority so that legal
separation was unlnown in the South. Goodsell 396.
25. McCurdy, supra note 23, at 689. See also Lichtenberger 98-99.
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fault grounds in some states. The fault doctrine presents an in-
consistency in the application of the civil contract theory of marriage.
While mutual consent is required to marry, the relationship created,
unlike other "civil contracts," can be terminated, in most states, only
by resort to fault grounds more properly found in the law of torts.2T
But the existence of this inconsistency in present divorce law and its
basis in legal history is only part of the present divorce problem
Superimposed upon the historical-legal developments of marriage
and divorce are profound changes in economics and sociology brought
about by industrial, political and religious revolutions. These changes
have affected both the physical and philosophical aspects of the family
unit while failing to have a comparable effect on the law governing
family disruption.
The industrial revolution has altered the physical nature of the
family- " Where once husband and wife worked side by side, children
were educated at home, and women depended on the family to eco-
nomically exist,*" the husband now works away from home, schools
and other outside activities draw children away from the family
circle, and women as a class are no longer economically tied to the
family." Transportation and communications have freed the individ-
ual from a local environment21 Household inventions and the oppor-
tunity to enhance the family pocketboot have encouraged the wife to
leave the kitchen and seek outside employment. An abundance of out-
side entertainment has taken the place of the home as the center of
recreation., Economic necessity and immobility, on which much of
the stability of the home once rested, are factors which, in the United
States, have largely ceased to exist.
Combined with economic influences on the physical nature of the
family is the spirit of individual self-realization that is reflected in
modern political institutions and religious and intellectual liberalism2a
2c. Ploscowe 249. The same volume, at 265-94, contains a compilation of the
various grounds for divorce available in the several states. See also Harper,
Problems of the Family 657-59 (1952), where the author collects the "uncommon"
grounds for divorce in order to show the trend in state legislative policy.
27. See note 7 supra. See also 73 Reports of The Am. Bar Ass'n 302 (1948),
whe re it is recommended that the whole American divorce structure be re-ex-
amned and revised along social rather than adversary lines.
28. See generally Mowrer, Family Disorganization 145-58 (2d ed. 1939) (here-
mafter cited as Mowrer); Lichtenberger 262.
29. M sser 261-66.
:0. Chapin, A Historical Introduction to Social Economy 182-214 (1917);
Mowrer 149-5S.
31. Chapin, op. cit. supra note .$Q, at 247-60.
32. Mowrer 145-58.
33. The relationship of these social forces to the divorce problem is treated
extensively by Lichtenberger 289-333.
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The basic democratic ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness reflect this desire for individualism."' Liberal religious thought
emphasizes conduct and social action, rather than historical church
doctrine.35 Recognizing that life is one of the highest values, this re-
ligious liberalism does not follow the early ecclesiastical idea of in-
dissoluble marriage, for it is felt to be inconsistent with the general
spirit of Christian teaching to attribute to God the authorship of a
loveless marriage.36 Individualism is reflected in the romantic concept
of marriage, which has replaced economic instigation and parental
control.3' More is demanded of each partner in the way of personal
satisfaction. While procreation has always been the primary purpose
of the union of sexes, the psychological value is now openly recog-
nized.88 Marriage, then, as a social institution, while naturally re-
flecting this individualism, is presently influenced by external pres-
sures of the competitive industrial world unknown to the pre-nine-
teenth century family. The greater chance of marriage between
persons of different cultures, educational levels, and communities adds
to this pressure.?" Upon comparison betveen the span of time that
marriage was controlled by environmental needs or by the church and
the sudden transition to the influences of today it is not surprising
that there has been an increase in the divorce rate. Whether this in-
crease is entirely the result of family instability cannot be accurately
determined. Certainly the divorce rate includes a direct reflection of
self-expressionism that would have been smothered in an earlier era.
However, mere resort to the doctrine of fault, created in a time when
the family relationship bore little resemblance to the one of today,
seems a shallow solution to the difficult divorce problem.
Because the doctrine of fault has proved an inadequate solution to
family discord, law makers, particularly in European countries,4' have
shifted the emphasis to the more realistic concept of "factual mar-
riage." This concept describes the actual rather than the legal rela-
34. See Lichtenberger 289-99. See also More, Bacon, Rousseau, Campanella,
Famous Utopias 3-125 (1937).
35. See Lichtenberger 319-29.
36. This view has been voiced even by some American clergymen. See Lichten-
berger 324-25.
37. See Mowrer 158-65; Lichtenberger 340-50.
38. See Mowrer 195-215; Lichtenberger 359-89. "Sex has come to play in
modern marriage a far greater role than formerly. It is bound up intimately
with the happiness and therefore with the stability of the marriage relation."
Liehtenberger 367.
39. Mowrer classifies the tensions influencing family disruption into four cate-
gories: (1) incompatibility in response, (2) economic individualization, (3) cul-
tural differentiation, and (4) individualization of life-patterns. Nowrer 196,
40. For a survey of European development of the "factual marriage" concept
see Silving, Divorce Without Fault, 29 Iowa L. Rev. 527 (1944).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1959/iss2/5
NOTES
tionship. If a husband and wife are living apart and have no intention
of resuming the marital relationship, the marriage, though existing
in law, no longer exists "in fact." Application of this theory to the
law has taken form as a ground for divorce upon separation of the
parties for a specified period of time. It is this theory that is the basis
of living apart statutes.4 1
PRESENT LIVING APART STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES
Twenty-two jurisdictions4- allow divorce pursuant to separation for
a specified period of time. The worth of these statutes cannot be fully
measured since they supplement rather than substitute for existing
fault grounds for divorce." Variations among the present statutes
make a comparison of the decisions of one state with those of another
of questionable value. The policy behind the statutes, however, seems
common to all jurisdictions; i.e., the interests of the parties and so-
ciety can best be served by granting a "legal" divorce where the mar-
riage has factually ceased to exist.4 4 By requiring a specific period of
separation, modern application of the statutes contemplates placing a
check on the parties to encourage reconciliation and preclude action in
the heat of anger .4
The legal question most often arising under present living apart
statutes concerns the nature of the separation contemplated. Colorado,
Minnesota, North Dakota and Utah limit the scope of their statutes to
suits for divorce only after the granting of a separate maintenance
decree." In other jurisdictions no restriction is made by the language
41. Living apart statutes have been advocated previously as a new approach to
the' divorce enigma. See McCurdy, supra note 23; Ploscowe 247-64.
42. Present living apart statutes and individual variations are collected in a
tahle at the end of this note.
43. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 247.07 (1957) where, in addition to providing
for divorce in the case of voluntary separation for a period of 5 years, the statute
includes adultery, impotency, sentence to imprisonment for 3 years or more, wilful
do-ertion for one year prior to action, cruel and inhuman treatment by husband
of wife, or vice versa, or if wife is given to intoxication, and habitual drunken-
ness for one year, as other grounds for divorce.
44. See Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 194, 89 So. 512, 513 (1921),
where the court stated, "Manifestly [the statute] intends to deal simply with a
social and economic status--a fait accompli; and, the remedy of divorce being
already available to the husband who has not consented thereto, it extends the
same remedy to the wife. The object is to put an end to a situation barren of good,
capable of evil, and probably irremediable by any other means." See also Parks
v. Parks, 116 F.2d 556, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Dawson v. Dawson, 62 Wyo. 519,
52A, 177 P.2d 200, 202 (1947); and see Keezer, Marriage and Divorce § 455 (3d
ed. 1946).
45. McCurdy, op. cit. supra note 28, at 700-01.
46. See table supported by notes 96, 101, 105, 108 infra.
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of the statute,47 and a former decree of separation is neither necessary
nor a bar to divorce on living apart grounds 48 A minority of courts
require mutual consent or voluntary separation40 This seems contra-
dictory to *the factual concept of marriage, since if one party leaves
the other with the intention of remaining away permanently the mar-
riage has factually ceased to exist. In most cases where voluntary
separation has been required the results were compelled by the word-
ing of the statute, rather than by judicial insistence., Where volun-
tary separation is essential it must be voluntary from inception to
expiration of the required statutory period,51 though this rule is some-
times modified where acquiescence to the separation is manifest over
a long period of time.52 All jurisdictions require complete physical
separation. This means living entirely separate and apart from bed
and board without cohabitation. 3 Some courts include separation
47. See table following this note.
48. Jones v. Jones, 199 Ark. 1000, 137 S.W.2d 238 (1940); George v. George,
56 Nev. 12, 41 P.2d 1059 (1935); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d
444 (1943) ; Dawson v. Dawson, 62 Wyo. 519, 177 P.2d 200 (1947).
49. Bowers v. Bowers, 143 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (involuntary separation
raised as a defense); Butler v. Butler, 154 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (willingness
of one party to effect reconciliation precluded separation from being voluntary);
Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229, 198 At. 414 (1938) (coerced acquiescence
raised as a defense, but wife found to have waived right to object because of lapse
of time); Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936) (must be mutual
agreement to separate); Powless v. Powless, 269 Wis. 552, 69 N.W.2d 753 (1955)
(desertion held not mutually voluntary).
50. See notes 95, 100, 111, 113 infra and table supported thereby. But cf.
Brooks vs. Brooks, 201 Ark. 14, 143 S.W.2d 1098 (1940), where the Arkansas
court, in construing its statute requiring separation by voluntary act or mutual
consent, held that parties were entitled to a divorce even if the wife had been
caused to separate involuntarily.
51. Owen v. Owen, 208 Ark. 23, 184 S.W.2d 808 (1945) (intermittent co-
habitation interrupting voluntary separation); McClure v. McClure, 205 Ark. 1032,
172 S.W.2d 243 (1943) (same); Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946)
(induction into service not voluntary); Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 16 A.2d 924
(1940) ; Miller v. Miller, 178 Md. 12, 11 A.2d 630 (1940) (involuntary separation
at inception). But cf. Bowers v. Bowers, 143 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (divorce
allowed because defendant failed to prove withdrawal of agreement to separate).
52. Parks v. Parks, 116 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (silent acquiescence as a
waiver of objection to separate); Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229, 198 Atl. 414
(1938) (wife deemed to have waived right to contest coerced agreement to
separate).
53. This generally means that a wife and husband living under the same roof
do not meet the statutory requirement. See Caine v. Caine, 262 Ala. 454, 79 So. 2d
546 (1955) (husband not deemed to have separated until he moved from house to
barn); Rogers v. Rogers, 258 Ala. 477, 63 So. 2d 807 (1953) (separate rooms in
the same dwelling not sufficient separation); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 292 Ky. 56,
165 S.W.2d 966 (1942); Christiansen v. Christiansen, 68 RL. 438, 28 A.2d 745
(1942) ; MeNary v. McNary, 8 Wash. 2d 250, 111 P.2d 760 (1941). In some
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caused by the imprisonment of one of the parties in computing time,
but separation caused by one spouse being committed to a mental in-
stitution cannot be used to comply with the statute.5 Time spent in
the armed services can be included, if preceded by the decision to
separate."
The doctrine of fault does not generally apply in actions brought
under present living separate and apart statutes," but Vermont and
Wyoming specifically exclude the party chargeable with fault from
bringing suit.-' Recriminatory defenses, derived from fault concepts,
are not generally available under the statutes.59 Some states, however,
take fault into consideration when passing on claims for alimony,
special circumstances, however, parties living under the same roof may qualify.
See Boyce v. Boyce, 153 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (spouses lived on separate
floors and did not take meals together) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 45 R. 375, 122 AtI.
778 (1923) (same building, but different apartments).
54. Colston v. Colston, 297 Ky. 250, 179 S.W.2d 893 (1944) (husband's con-
finement included in computing time of separation); Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 440,
43 S.W. 168 (1897) (husband serving life term). But see Sitterson v. Sitterson,
191 N.C. 319, 131 S.E. 641 (1926) (imprisonment held not to be voluntary and
therefore could not be counted in determining requisite separation).
55. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 94 F. Supp. 917 (D.C.D.C. 1950), aff'd 195 F.2d 567 (D.C.
Cir. 1952) (insanity can't be counted even though voluntary separation before
period of insanity); Clark v. Clark, 215 La. 835, 41 So. 2d 734 (1949) (no volun-
tary separation where cause of separation is insanity). See also Serio v. Serio,
201 Ark. 11, 143 S.W.2d 1097 (1940); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 215 N.C. 685, 3
S.E.2d 5 (1939). The general theory behind these decisions is that an insane
person is not capable of decision. But see Knabe v. Berman, 234 Ala. 433, 175
So. 354 (1937), where the court held insanity was irrelevant under the Alabama
statute.
56. Mogensky v. Mogensky, 212 Ark. 28, 204 S.W.2d 782 (1947) (service time
included where separation was prior to induction); Davis v. Watts, 208 La. 290,
23 So. 2d 97 (1945) (implied) ; Moody v. Moody, 225 N.C. 89, 33 S.E.2d 491 (1945)
(dictum).
57. Parks v. Parks, 116 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (party suing entirely at fault
held not to bar divorce); Mohr v. Mohr, 214 Ark. 607, 215 S.W.2d 1020 (1949) ;
Colston v. Colston, 297 Ky. 250, 179 S.W.2d 893 (1944); Kohlsaat v. KohIsaat,
62 Nev. 485, 155 P.2d 474 (1945); McKenna v. McKenna, 53 RI. 373, 166 At.
822 (1933).
58. This is provided specifically in the statutes of these states. See notes 109,
112 infra and table supported thereby. Although the North Carolina statute is
silent, decisions indicate that fault on the part of the spouse bringing the action
may preclude him from securing a divorce on living apart grounds. See Taylor v.
Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945); Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25
S.E.2d 471 (1943).
59. See, eg., Joliffe v. Joliffe, 76 Idaho 95, 278 P.2d 200 (1954). But see note
58 supra for those states which fail to separate fault considerations in living
apart statutes.
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child custody and property rights.0 Since the doctrine of fault is
generally an unnecessary element in living apart statutes and because
the basic influences behind the rising divorce rate may be attributed
to factors other than fault, it is the purpose of the remainder of this
note to estimate the worth of living apart statutes as a complete re-
placement for existing fault grounds for divorce.
LIVING APART AS THE SOLE GROUND FOR DIVORCE
In assessing the worth of living apart statutes as the sole ground for
divorce it is necessary to consider their effect (1) as a replacement
for present fault grounds, (2) on the divorce rate, and (3) on the
interests of the families involved in marital difficulties. In making
this estimate living apart statutes are considered in their most desir-
able form; i.e., where separation may be established by one or both
parties, and where the period of separation required is not too long,
thereby discouraging the displacement of fault grounds and disserving
the interests of the parties, but is not so short that divorce would be
encouraged, thereby defeating the worth of the restrictive period re-
quired prior to the granting of a divorce.
Effect as a Replacement for Fault
Replacement of fault grounds by living apart statutes substitutes a
realistic approach for an unrealistic one. Divorce, under separation
statutes, would not be precluded where true "legal" fault grounds
existed, while divorce could be procured where the factual cause of
family disruption did not meet present existing statutory fault
grounds. The concept of fault assumes that only specified conduct
justifies a judicial remedy,6 when, in fact, the marital difficulties may
be caused by a more basic conflict in the disposition and attitudes of
the parties.2 Present grounds for divorce are so limited in some juris-
dictions that continuous unharmonious conduct and even criminal be-
havior may not justify divorce.0 In other jurisdictions fault is so
extended that two slaps by the husband"4 or kissing the wife of one's
60. Mohr v. Mohr, 214 Ark. 607, 215 S.W.2d 1020 (1949); Joliffe v. Joliffe, 76
Idaho 95, 278 P.2d 200 (1954); Sandlin v. Sandlin, 289 Ky. 290, 158 S.W.2d 635
(1942) ; Davis v. Watts, 208 La. 290, 23 So. 2d 97 (1945).
61. See note 7 supra.
62. See notes 28-89 and text supported thereby.
63. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cohen, 200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
where a wife was denied a divorce because of the limited grounds available, even
though her husband had pleaded guilty and was convicted of sodomy. This case is
severely criticised in Ploscowe 97, 257.
64. See Berlingieri v. Berlingieri, 372 Ill. 60, 22 N.E.2d 675 (1939), where
under a statute requiring extreme and repeated cruelty the court held that evi-
dence of two slaps, corroborated by witnesses, was sufficient cruelty to justify
divorce. This case or a similar one is noted, but not cited, in Ploscowe 248.
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cotisin' may pave the way to the domestic court. About ninety percent
of all divorces are granted in non-contested default cases,'6 indicating
that generally both parties want the divorce and belying the need for
a court contest. By eliminating fault requirements any collusive ac-
tions now practiced as a fraud on the court would become unneces-
sary,,,
Standard defenses to an action of divorce also approach the prob-
lem unrealistically. Recrimination, which provides that where both
parties have "legal" grounds for divorce neither party has adequate
grounds, presupposes that a court can order antagonistic parties to live
together as man and wife.-, In fact, separation normally results, and
where adultery is the recriminatory offense meretricious relations can
be expected. Condonation, another standard defense, assumes that the
marital relationship has not been destroyed as evidenced by subse-
quent cohabitation, " while in reality, it is usually evidence that
parties have tried again without success as indicated by their pres-
ence in court. Recrimination and condonation are irrelevant under
living apart statutes?"
The power of the courts to determine support, alimony and property
rights would not be diminished under non-fault statutes. Ordinarily
parties contemplating divorce attempt to settle property rights be-
65. Elder v. Elder, 186 S.W. 530 (Mo. App. 1916), where the court held that
th., conduct of the husband in kissing the wife of his cousin whose presence in
the house was known to be obnoxious to his spouse constituted a sufficient indig-
nity to justify divorce. The Missouri statutory ground under which the decree
was rendered in this case lends itself to extreme liberality in the granting of
divorce. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.010 (1949) provides that divorce may be granted
when either party "[S]hall offer such indignities to the other as shall render
hi,; or her condition intolerable . . . ." Charles v. Charles, 208 S.W.2d 476
(Mo. App. 1948), illustrates the variety of indignities which may justify divorce.
In this case the wife complained that the husband requested money from the
wife's relatives, refused to disclose his finances to the wife, and made unseemly
complaints about the provisions of the will of his mother-in-law. A divorce was
granted.
66. Sayre, Divorce for the Unworthy, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 26, 27 (1953).
67. Id. at 28. For a discussion of some collusive and fraudulent practices in
the New York courts see Ploscowe 99-102.
68. Walker, Our Present Divorce Muddle, 35 A.B.A.J. 457 (1949).
69. Johnson, Suppressed, Delayed, Damaging and Avoided Divorces, 18 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 72, 80 (1953), refers to condonation as "a tricky method of de-
feating a divorce action."
70. This is due to the different fundamental policy underlying living apart
statutes and the total rejection of fault concepts in any divorce action. See
MeCurdy, supra note 23, at 705-06. When you recognize that the law can't compel
Ipat ties to live together, "[Y]ou acknowledge that the grounds for divorce are but
onhappy conflicts exposed to salacious, prurient, curious, critical, puritanical and
filthy minds for no good reason at all." Walker, supra note 68, at 459. See also
Plo0cowe 258,
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tween themselves.1' Where a settlement cannot be reached during the
period of separation or where the husband refuses to support the
wife, she could bring an action for separate maintenance for herself or
for support of any children and the court could determine the issues
as effectively and forcefully as under present statutes. Upon determi-
nation that an estranged husband and wife have met the requirements
of living apart entitling them to a divorce decree, custody and support
of children would be decided by the court in a manner similar to pres-
ent practice; i.e., in the best interests of the offspring involved. Dur-
ing separation or upon granting of a divorce the duty to support
children remains the same, since this duty arises by virtue of the birth
of issue and not because of the marital status.72 For awards of ali-
mony or property rights, the court retains control, but in jurisdictions
presently making awards based on comparative fault, substitution of
living apart statutes would require a change of standard. For ex-
ample, in states where alimony is now granted to the wife only if she
is not chargeable with fault,7 3 a court operating under a living apart
statute could award support to the wife whether or not she was the
moving party for the divorce and regardless of her role in the factual
breakup of the marriage.74 This recognizes that the duty of support
should not be penalizing or rewarding in nature. Instead, it should
arise from a factual analysis of whether the wife is, or is not, placed
temporarily or permanently in a state of dependency due to circum-
stances arising out of the marriage relationship. The public policy in-
volved in defining support rights and alimony is better served when
rights are based on the wealth and particular needs of the parties and
not based on fault.7 5
71. Walkei, supra note 68, at 460.
72. If the duty to support children arose solely out of the marital status there
would be no point to paternity cases.
73. E.g., present Missouri law provides that the party at fault in a divorce
proceeding "forfeits all rights and claims under and by virtue of the marriage."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.090 (1949). This statute has been held to preclude the party
at fault from recovering any award of permanent alimony. Willis v. Willis, 274
S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1954); Motley v. Motley, 93 Mo. App. 473, 67 S.W. 741
(1902). If Missouri adopted a living apart statute as its sole ground for divorce,
since fault is irrelevant, the present rule would have to be changed and alimony
would be awarded on other bases. See note 75 infra.
74. It is probably a rare case where one party is altogether innocent or en-
tirely at fault. Spouses merely show reaction to marital discord in different ways.
See Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 377 (1937).
In addition, awards solely on relative fault are based on tort principles which
should have no bearing on family law. See note 7 supra.
75. Illustrative of considerations that can be used in determining alimony,
other than resort to fault are expressed in Nickerson v. Nickerson, 152 Neb. 799,
801-02, 42 N.W.2d 861, 862 (1950), as follows: "In determining the question of
alimony or division of property as between the parties the court, in exercising its
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Effect on the Divorce Rate
A basic purpose of living apart statutes is to provide a period of
contemplation as a deterrent to ill-considered action. The compara-
tively few cases based on present living apart statutes can perhaps be
attributed to the relatively long period of separation required in most
jurisdictions-, and to existing and often innocuous fault grounds,77
which provide a more expedient means of obtaining judicial relief.
The effect of the waiting period would tend to minimize in the minds
of the parties the perhaps over-inflated forces which have divided
them. Life apart might provide a greater awareness of dependency
upon one another for companionship and comforts, and time might de-
stroy the desire to marry another.7 8 Fault grounds bring parties to-
gether in court to continue their battle, widening rather than narrow-
ing the breach. It is unrealistic for the law to be structured around
the preservation of the family unit and a desire to see the disunited
reunited, while at the same time providing an arena and weapons to
continue the fight, solemnly awarding a prize to the winner.79 In con-
trast, separation statutes allow for reconciliation by providing for a
truce between embattled spouses.
Adoption of living apart statutes is recognition that the divorce
rate does not necessarily indicate a weakening of the social institution
of marriage, but is merely a record of individual marriages declared
broken by judicial decree. Whether divorce is forbidden or numerous
grounds are provided, the number of broken or unhappy homes re-
mains unaffected. Family disruption is not determined by judicial
decree, but by separation, needing no "legal" declaration to exist in
sound discretion, will consider the respective ages of the parties to the marriage;
their earning ability; the duration of and the conduct of each during the marriage;
their station in life, including the social standing, comforts and luxuries of life
which the wife would probably have enjoyed; the circumstances and necessities of
each; their health and physical condition; and their financial circumstances as
shown by the property they owned at the time of the divorce, its value at that
time, its income producing capacity if any, whether accumulated or acquired
before or after the marriage, the manner in which it was acquired, and the con-
tributions each has made thereto and, from all the relevant facts and circum-
stances relating thereto, determine the rights of the parties and make an award
that is equitable and just." The court's reference to conduct of the parties would,
of course, become irrelevant under living apart statutes.
76. E.g., Rhode Island requires 10 years separation, Texas requires 7 years,
and Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District
of Columbia all require 5 years separation. See table following this note.
77. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:7, which provides 13 grounds for
absolute divorce, including a ground providing for divorce when either party has
so treated the other as to seriously injure health or endanger reason.
78. Walker, supra note 68, at 459.
79. Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses Out of the Trenches, 18 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 98, 101 (1953).
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fact. Concern over the divorce rate exists partly because it is known
and measurable, while immorality and continuous disruption in the
absence of a judicial decree, perhaps greater social problems, are
largely ignored because they are concealed and unmeasurable. 0
Factual divorce will continue whether living apart statutes or fault
grounds are the basis for judicial relief. "Legal" divorce should be
recognized as the antonym of wedding, i.e., an acknowledgment that
a marriage contract can be terminated as it was formed, by mutual
consent,,' so long as the interests of the parties and society are pro-
tected by requiring conformity with specific statutory requirements.
Since sociological reasons lie at the heart of the divorce problem, per-
haps more stringent requirements for marriage 2 and provisions for
counseling 3 during the period of separation would more effectively
reduce the factual family disruptions which are reflected in the di-
vorce rate.
Effect on the Family
The sole concern of the law should not be to reduce the divorce rate;
rather it should seek to provide for the best interests of the family in
each instance and let the divorce rate be so determined. A court can-
not adjudicate the best interests of the husband and wife. In a judi-
cial proceeding it is impossible to discover the many factors that de-
termine the attitudes and satisfy the personality needs of the parties.
What can the law do? It can, by requiring counseling, provide the
opportunity for husband and wife to discover the reasons for the fail-
ure of their marriage and on this basis allow them to decide whether
reconciliation or dissolution will best fulfill their interests. 4 Although
belief in reconciliation may not be strong enough for the spouses to
contribute sufficient cooperation to make counseling effective, at least
one compulsory meeting could be required with opportunity for more
80. See Lichtenberger 431-32.
81. Walker, supra note 68, at 458.
82. Ploscowe attributes much of the increase in the divorce rate to the lax
marriage laws prevalent in the majority of states. Ploscowe at 6. See also Red-
mount, Marriage Trends and Divorce Policies, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 513, 545-51 (1957),
for suggestions for tightening marriage laws.
83. See note 84 infra.
84. Counseling in conjunction with divorce proceedings and through the media
of a family court has been advocated by a number of writers. See Alexander,
supra note 79; Alexander, The Lawyer's Dilemma in Divorce, 33 Kan. City
B.J. 7 (Dec. 1958); Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 49 (1953); MacKenzie, Spiritual Values and the Family In Court, 18 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 20 (1953); Goode, Compulsory Counseling, 2 Va. L. Weekly Dicta
Comp. 74 (1949-50) ; Sicher, Consolidated Courts, 2 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp.
78 (1949-50).
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if the parties so desired. But counseling might become a mere hurdle
to overcome before the divorce could be granted, if, in addition, a
definite period of separation is not provided. By requiring a period
of separation a check can be placed on poorly considered acts, thereby
assuring any reconciliatory effect that the counseling might have dur-
ing the waiting period.
Probably the greatest concern of society and of the law is the effect
of divorce on the children of the broken homes. Approximately 300,000
children are affected by divorce each year.s8 If the number of children
suffering under the discord of unhappy unbroken homes is added the
figures become much larger.- It has long been assumed that broken
homes are detrimental to a child's personality and contribute to in-
creasing juvenile delinquency. There is little doubt that a happy un-
broken home bestows the greatest benefits upon a child's mental and
physical well-being. However, when comparing unhappy unbroken
homes with happy broken homes there is a question whether divorce
or the marital conflict itself is more damaging to the child87 Recent
surveys- indicate that an unhappy unbroken home may be more harm-
ful to a child's development than one where the disharmony is ended
by separation or divorce." If this is true, living apart statutes would
afford greater consideration to children than present fault grounds.
Where fault grounds would presently not prove adequate for a di-
vorce, even though total family disharmony existed, living apart
statutes would allow divorce, thus removing the child from the in-
fluence of constant family friction. In addition, living apart statutes
treat divorce as a necessary social adjustment, thereby tending to re-
move any social stigma which attaches to the child of a broken home.
CONCLUSION
Living apart statutes, while simplifying present divorce practice,
better serving the interests of the parties and approaching makital
85. Ernst & Loth, For Better or Worse 226 (1952).
86. Nye, Child Adjustment in Broken and in Unhappy Unbroken Homes, 19
Marriage and Family Living 356 (1957).
87. Goode, After Divorce 307-10 (1956).
88. Some of these surveys may be found in Goode, After Divorce 308-13 (1956).
See also Monahan, The Trend in Broken Homes Among Delinquent Children, 19
Marriage and Family Living 362 (1957). Shaw & McKay, Social Factors in
Juvenile Delinquency, Washington; National Commission of Law Observance and
Enforcement, Report No. 13, Vol. II, 1931, 275-76.
89. In a test administered to children of three groups: happy unbroken homes,
unhappy unbroken homes, and broken homes, the attitudes of the children showed
similarities between the broken homes and the unhappy unbroken homes; but on
the majority of items, the children from the unhappy homes had the poorest
showing of all. See Nye, Child Adjustment in Broken and in Unhappy Unbroken
Homes, 19 Marriage and Family Living 356, 358 (1957).
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disputes with a more realistic design, are by no means a complete
solution to the complex divorce problem. Other reforms are neces-
sary. 0 Some form of uniform divorce law along living apart lines is
needed, for a living apart statute would lose much of its effectiveness
if the parties could go to a neighboring state to obtain a "quickie"
divorce. Special domestic relations courts are needed to handle all
kinds of family problems,91 thereby recognizing that most family diffi-
culties are social rather than strictly legal problems. A uniform tight-
ening of marriage laws across the country, providing for a minimal
waiting period between registration and the ceremony would at least
preclude the hasty marriages which often end in divorce. 2 As long
as resort to fault grounds is the predominant method for obtaining a
divorce there seems to be little chance for any reform. Certainly the
rise in the divorce rate refutes a contention that fault grounds are an
effective means of solving the problem of family disruption. Living
apart statutes are at least a new and direct approach to sorely needed
reform in American divorce law.
90. See generally Ploscowe 247-64.
91. For a list of advocates of the family court see note 84 supra.
92. See note 82 supra.
93. Ala. Code tit. 34, § 22(1) (Supp. 1957).
94. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-312 (1956).
95. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1202(7) (Supp. 1955).
96. Colo. Rev. Stat. 46-1-2(9) (Supp. 1958).
97. Idaho Code Ann. § 32-610 (1947).
98. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.020 (1) (b) (Baldwin 1955).
99. La. Rev. Stat. § 9:301 (1950).
100. Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 16, § 24 (1957).
101. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.06 (8) (West Supp. 1958).
102. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.010 (1957).
103. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:7 (Supp. 1957).
104. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6 (1950)
105. N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0605 (1943).
106. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-3 (1956)
107. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4629 (4) (Vernon's Supp. 1958).
108. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(8) (Supp. 1957).
109. Vt. Rev. Stat. § 3205 (7) (1947).
110. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.08.020(9) (1958).
111. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 247.07(7) (1957).
112. Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 3-5906 (1945).
113. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-403 (1951).
114. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 321(9) (1955).
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